If the evidence presented in the preceding chapters is circumstantial, nonetheless it is substantial. Faith in human rights may not be affirmed by a majority of the inhabitants of the globe, but it is affirmed in the major religious traditions of the world and on every inhabited continent and in almost every culture.

Understandings of human rights developed in liberal, socialist and Third World contexts may be seen as different emphases within a common tradition of faith. This tradition is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is accepted by all as the foundation for human rights law. Moreover, this tradition continues to develop, especially due to concerns in the Third World. Liberal and socialist concepts of human rights are being recast to reflect indigenous cultural and religious notions of the necessary conditions for human dignity.

Clearly, members of different religious traditions affirm human rights as a part of their faith. These affirmations differ, but such differences occur not only between the traditions but also within a particular tradition. For instance, Christians differ about the justification of human rights not only with Buddhists, but also among themselves. However, among those who affirm human rights there is considerable agreement as to both the fundamental importance of human rights in the modern world and the content of human rights. Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is affirmed within all the major world religious traditions, and manyreligious leaders and institutions are working cooperatively for the protection of human rights through law.

Thus, faith in human rights is not merely international but inter-religious. Faith in human rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as evident in socialist and Third World countries as well as in Western liberal contexts, is now affirmed within the major religious traditions of the globe.

Is there enough commonality among those who affirm human rights to speak of a global faith? I believe so. History, and not philosophy, will define human rights. As Ludwig Wittgenstein has suggested, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language."¹ The use of the phrase "human rights" is changing in the world, even as I write, for advocacy on behalf of human rights is a sign of the times. Thus, we need to heed Wilfred Cantwell Smith's reminder: "words do not themselves mean anything; it is only people that mean something, by the words that they use."² The meaning of human rights will be shaped more by people than by the rules of language or logic.

I am not suggesting that there is a single, global philosophy or theology of human rights.³ Enormous diversity of belief and conviction exist among those who embrace human rights as a standard for law and justice. However, at the level of practice or "action expressing faith," there is surprising and substantial agreement.⁴ Despite differences of doctrine, men and women of various religious traditions are in fact working together, with those who profess no religious conviction, to secure human rights for all peoples.

This would seem to illustrate the maxim by Wilfred Cantwell Smith that the meaning "the historian finds, incorporates more truth than the doctrine does."⁵ There is no single doctrine of human rights, but there is a history of the movement to secure human rights. The different theories of human rights may not suggest a global faith, but the practice of human rights advocacy does.

The concept of faith is problematic, for it means different things to different people. However, I did not introduce "faith" as a category of analysis in this study. Faith is a central concept within human rights advocacy. It is simply an empirical fact that people around the world affirm faith in human rights.

The UN Charter begins: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. . .."⁶ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the same reaffirmation of faith, and the Universal Declaration is affirmed by most if not all those involved in human rights advocacy.⁷ Faith here means at least that there are given, universal standards, which are to be protected by law if humanity is to be saved from self-destruction. It means that there is a moral order in the universe to which we are to respond.

In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights no argument is made for a philosophical or theological foundation for human rights, nor are legal precedents used to justify human rights law. When the Universal Declaration was approved in 1948 there was no consensus about the foundation of justice and law. The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights might well have concluded, with Max Stackhouse, that "Every philosophy rests not on reason alone, but on fundamental faith assumptions."⁸ Thus, there is a sense in which faith is a necessary condition for human rights, as for all moral claims. Human rights are not merely derived from deductive argument, but are an expression of faith.

However, it is of greater significance that for some of those who drafted the Universal Declaration, as well as for many who later embraced it, faith in human rights is not merely necessary but compelling. As Prem Kirpal observes: "The ultimate sanction of the true observance of human rights rests in the faith and commitment of societies as reflected in the beliefs and values of individuals."⁹

As early as 1951, Jacques Maritain suggested that the convergence of different traditions was a kind of "secular faith."¹⁰ Cornelius Murphy uses the same phrase in asserting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "can be viewed as the expression of a common secular faith in the worth of the human person."¹¹ Similarly, Earl Warren affirms: "we acquire our faith in the objectives of the nations of the world and of the justification for the United Nations itself" from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for it expresses "our faith in humanity, the kind of faith that is based on things not seen."¹²

Vratislav Pechota, Legal Adviser for the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1968 and a leader of the Charter '77 movement protesting human rights violations, writes that international human rights

Hernán Montealegre, writing of human rights education sponsored by churches and other nongovernmental organizations in Latin America, notes that:

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall expresses a faith shared by many human rights advocates: "We shall continue along the lawful road—at all times operating within the law, relying upon the law, and with faith in the democratic processes because time and right are both on our side."¹⁵ Human rights demonstrators in the People's Republic of China assert that "Faith is mankind's spiritual life."¹⁶

Paul Brietzke quotes the affirmation by Andrei Sakharov, noted Soviet scientist and human rights advocate:

Brietzke concludes: "This is the faith that will drive forward the right to development—if the right and its advocates prove worthy."¹⁸

If the term "faith" is common in affirmations of human rights, other religious images are used even more frequently. Torkal Opsahl, Norwegian legal scholar and member of the European Commission on Human Rights, refers to international human rights law as an ideology "which replaces religion for some of us."¹⁹ And Louis Pettiti, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, asserts that human rights may play an important ethical role in that, "They are sometimes, for unbelievers, a substitute for religious motivations, stimulating a will to commit themselves."²⁰

The religious nature of human rights was clear to Jimmy Carter, when as president of the United States he spoke to the World Jewish Congress.

Even the late Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, used a religious image in referring to fundamental human rights: "let us place first among all human rights the most sacred of them all—the right to life, and, consequently, to a lasting peace."²² Furthermore, young Chinese refer to "sacred democratic rights."²³

Peter K. Y. Woo suggests that "moral and religious reflection" is "the true foundation from which human rights can be derived."²⁴ Louis Henkin speaks of the "theology" of human rights,²⁵ and John Courtney Murray of the "gospel of human rights."²⁶ Jeanne Hersch writes of the "incarnation of human rights in history."²⁷ Terje Wold, chief justice of Norway, affirms "the spiritual fight for human rights."²⁸ Leo C. Ferrari argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the first step in checking the "short-sighted, destructive individualism" of the West, for it moves in the direction of "some Great Vision which will lay hold of the very heart of humanity itself and lift it to universal compassion, love and understanding."²⁹

It is clear then that Carl Friedrich speaks for many in affirming that "the core of man's dignity is his conviction, his belief, his faith" and that community is "built on faith in human rights."³⁰ As Jerome Shestack observes: "Most of the laborers in the field of human rights believe that there is a moral inevitability to human rights. I believe that."³¹

Advocates of human rights usually call for more than respect for the law. Commitment, sacrifice and even one's life may be demanded. This call to struggle for human rights as an ultimate concern is rooted in the history of the human rights tradition. The rights considered "natural" in the eighteenth century, though often presented in secular language, reflect a view of nature "derived from Christian ethics."³² In addition, the doctrine of natural law supports human rights with "a deep and abiding faith in man and his capacity for virtue and self-improvement."³³

Moreover, human rights are grounded in a rejection of the state's claim to ultimate authority. Even in socialist nations this facade of absolute authority is beginning to crumble.³⁴ Fundamental to human rights affirmations is "the belief that rights inhere in the individual,"³⁵ as a member of a community. All around the globe religious and community leaders are struggling with advocates of law and order who deny in practice, if not in principle, that human rights constitute a "higher law."

Of course, David Sidorsky is correct in suggesting that the concept of "human rights" is "the most recent of a series of terms over which semantic battles are waged in order to legitimate competing political and social attitudes."³⁶ The ideological battle over "human rights" continues to be intense. Furthermore, the fact that human rights are founded on faith is no guarantee against mere rhetoric and "bad faith" among those affirming human rights for political reasons.

However, this does not overcome the evidence already presented of the sincerity and conviction of many, who affirm faith in human rights. The fact that human rights are asserted in bad faith does not outweigh the substantial evidence that many people all over the world affirm human rights in good faith.

For example, William Korey believes the appeal of Soviet Jewish "refuseniks" signifies "an extraordinary faith in the Helsinki Final Act, that somehow this document will finally bring redress, if not salvation, from an intolerable burden."³⁷ Similarly, in the Third World Samuel Rayan writes: "We see the church taking shape where Jesus-reality is being actualized in history by defense of human dignity and human rights in a struggle even unto death."³⁸ When many continue to risk and lose their lives for such a faith, it can hardly be discounted as mere rhetoric.

Thus, Pavel Litvinov wisely suggests that the struggle to enforce human rights law requires a "healthy skepticism, combined with faith in durable spiritual values," rather than blind faith in utopian ideals.³⁹ Faith in human rights requires rationality as well as conviction and will.

The responses to a questionnaire I circulated at the 1987 International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg may shed additional light on what faith in human rights in fact means to people today.⁴⁰ When participants were asked—after being reminded of the affirmation of faith in human rights in the Universal Declaration—if they had "faith in fundamental human rights," twenty-two of twenty-five respondents answered "Yes." These respondents, from seventeen countries, indicated religious affiliations including: Roman Catholicism, several Protestant denominations, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and none.⁴¹

There was less unanimity as to whether this faith in human rights was religious faith. Of the twenty-two respondents who indicated that they had faith in fundamental human rights, seven affirmed that they would describe this faith as "religious" and eleven asserted that they would describe it as "not religious." Many of those responding were not comfortable with such an either/or choice: some checked neither, some checked both, and several wrote extended comments explaining their ambivalence.

One Christian respondent wrote: "My 'faith' is not in human rights, per se, but in a transcendent basis." A respondent who affirmed faith in human rights, but indicated no religious affiliation and declined to describe her faith as either "religious" or "not religious," commented: "Personally I also have faith in God's help to make possible the respect of human rights by persons and governments." A Roman Catholic respondent who affirmed faith in human rights, but described his faith as "not religious," wrote: "humanitarian principles are as important as religious matters."

A Jewish student, who described her faith in human rights as both "religious" and "not religious," stated: "[it] stems from my religious as well as non-religious beliefs." A Mennonite student answering in the same way wrote: "As a Christian I consider that everyone is equal. But even if I was a non-Christian I would consider that everyone is equal." Similarly, a Catholic respondent commented: "I think the protection of faith includes both religious and non-religious belief. I believe in one faith, but do not feel I should impose my belief on others."

A Christian respondent who affirmed faith in human rights, but declined to describe his faith as either "religious" or "not religious," asserted: "I don't believe in human rights by themselves. The only faith I can have is in the way of life to which Jesus invites us; but that, of course, is a way in which human rights are respected." Another Christian student, who affirmed faith in human rights and described her faith as "religious," affirmed: "Without a divinely given basis for human rights, all statements of rights become arbitrary and a hodge-podge of relativistic, undefinable propositions."

A Catholic respondent, who indicated her faith in human rights was "not religious," asserted: "I think the value of a human being is inherent in that human quality and not influenced in any way by any religious conviction of the person interpreting or having these rights." And a student without religious affiliation, who affirmed faith in human rights but described her faith as "not religious," wrote: "The main thing is people, not whether they confess this or that religion."

Clearly, several respondents to my questionnaire hesitated to describe their faith in human rights as "religious" because of the parochial connotation of the word. Few intimated that faith in human rights, which is "not religious," is less ultimate or less important or inconsistent with faith in God. Moreover, those claiming participation in a religious tradition expressed the significance of human rights in terms of their religious faith.

In considering whether faith in human rights is a kind of religious faith, or is at least strikingly similar, it should be remembered that until quite recently religion and law were not the mutually exclusive concepts they are today. The history of law in the world involves the study of religion, and the elaboration of religious ethics in all traditions involves law. I agree with Harold Berman's assertion that a people cannot live for long without a vision "of the interaction of law and faith."⁴² Law is founded on religious vision, which in turn is expressed in law.⁴³

A similar conviction moved René Cassin, French statesman and primary author of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "to interrelate religion and human rights" and to affirm "that a direct and powerful relationship existed between the Ten Commandments and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."⁴⁴ The claims of human rights are ultimate, but law by itself cannot make such claims. Thus, for Christians the claims of human rights are founded upon religious claims, as they are for Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and those of other religious traditions.

In addition, the very enterprise of human rights law is "fundamentally different" from the rest of international law in that human rights law is not justified by national self-interest, but subordinates it to the common good of the world community and its individual members.⁴⁵ Human rights law has to do with the standards of law itself, with the values that give law moral authority, and with establishing the conditions for life with human dignity. While not a religion, human rights law is a faith. And for many in the world, as demonstrated earlier, this faith is central to their religious convictions.

It is not surprising then that Jews, Muslims and Christians find human rights principles revealed in their scriptures.⁴⁶ Many Christians "have long held that the basic freedom and protections of human rights doctrine are divinely revealed in and through the natural order of creation."⁴⁷ These rights and freedoms may also be discerned by reason. For many, faith and reason converge in human rights.

For instance, Robert Gordis argues that the prophet Micah's faith in God is not diminished by his "faith in man's capacity to achieve the ideal by the free exercise of his reason and will."⁴⁸ Similarly, H. Morren, a Roman Catholic, asserts: "fighting for the respect of Human Rights belongs to the practice of our faith, a Gospel inspired action."⁴⁹ Faith in humanity, and thus in the realization of human rights through law, may be the result of faith in God.

If revelation as a source of authority is rejected, as in much of Western liberal thought, nonetheless this Western cultural tradition may be seen to involve faith:

Turning to reason may be as much an act of faith as turning to sources of revelation.

This is evident in statements relating human rights to human aspirations throughout history:

On its face this is more a statement of faith in human rights than a rational argument for them. It is more of a declaration of revealed truth than a matter of drawing logical conclusions. When put into practice it means simply that "true respect for human rights is nothing less than a way of life."⁵²

Faith in human rights may be identified with faith in God, as is clearly the case for Christians, Jews and Muslims. On the other hand, Buddhist Masao Abe argues that faith in God is a limitation that is not necessary in affirming human rights. Whether one agrees or not, for many who believe in God it seems "obvious that the basis of human right [sic] lies, in the final analysis, in God's plan of creation."⁵³ Jews and Muslims, as well as other Christians, may agree with Ricardo Antoncich that "Faith in a transcendental God is the best guarantee of human rights because it avoids all idolatrous manipulation of legitimacy and ideologies."⁵⁴

Moreover, at least some Jews as well as Christians and Muslims are clear that faith in God is not the same as mere belief in God.⁵⁵ The emphasis in Judaism is upon "conformity in practice, not upon unanimity in belief," because it has a "basic democratic faith" in the "freedom of the human spirit."⁵⁶ The Hebrew term emunah, which is usually translated "faith," means to trust and applies to acts, not beliefs: "For this reason, Judaism has no symbolic books, no articles of faith. No one has to swear to creedal symbols or subscribe, by solemn oath, to certain articles of faith."⁵⁷ Faith in human rights involves struggling for them, not believing anything in particular about God.

It is important also to note that faith may be an important concept within a religious tradition such as Buddhism, which does not even acknowledge a God. Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues:

Buddhist C. Jinarajadasa affirms that the personality of the Buddha created "the broad platform of a universal Faith."⁵⁹ Thus, the faith which many affirm in human rights, even if not linked to belief in God, may be comparable to some if not all forms of religious faith.

Mark Juergensmeyer writes, in his study of Gandhi: "Do you believe in human rights? If so, you are affirming a belief in a higher moral order and accepting a conviction of Western thought that parallels Gandhi's insistence on the dignity of all life."⁶⁰ This affirmation of a moral reality—what Gandhi called "Truth"—is "largely an act of faith."⁶¹

I agree with Mark Juergensmeyer and Wilfred Cantwell Smith that faith is not dependent upon a set of beliefs about God, but involves a trusting response to the moral order of the universe. The affirmation of human rights, which involves a commitment to bring into greater realization the moral order which now is corrupted, is faith regardless of what one believes about God. Moreover, I agree with Wilfred Cantwell Smith that much of the humanist tradition in the West affirms just such a transcendent moral order with or without a doctrine of God.⁶² In fact, it is clear that human rights have evolved in the West as the "higher law" within such a view of the ultimate order of the universe.

As the search for a "higher law" is not limited to Western intellectual traditions, I believe that faith in human rights can reasonably be affirmed as a global concept. Neither "human rights" nor "faith" are merely Western concepts. Therefore, whether or not faith in human rights is global is more an empirical question than a matter of philosophical consistency or semantics.

It is useful to note here that the participants in the 1987 International Institute of Human Rights, who in response to my questionnaire affirmed their faith in human rights, came from sixteen countries on six continents and were affiliated with four major religious traditions whose members are spread around the world. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence presented earlier that many others worldwide affirm faith in human rights.⁶³

However, certainly one may and many do resist the notion of any universal values or community of faith. The argument for cultural relativism is not easily overcome, for it would seem that exceptions can be found to any generalization about universal standards.⁶⁴ It is also extremely difficult to demonstrate that there is in any sense a global community to sustain such values, if in fact they exist. Moreover, it is clear that faith in human rights takes varied forms in different cultures and different times.

Agreement on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its centrality in all affirmations of human rights is a significant element of any response to the claims of cultural relativism. The Universal Declaration and its statement of faith in human rights is taught, legislated and affirmed all over the globe.⁶⁵ Its principles are applied with varying emphases in vastly different cultures. At times exception is taken to one or more of its principles. However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not been rejected in any culture or religious tradition and is warmly embraced in most.⁶⁶

In addition, it is clear that human rights are evolving as concerned men and women worldwide seek to secure the conditions for human dignity in their own communities. Change and reform of a tradition should not be confused with incoherence or relativism. The development of human rights in law and religious ethics is happening all over the world because men and women with faith in human rights are working and struggling together for human dignity.

Willibald P. Pahr, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, writes:

Of course, not all agree that a basic core of human rights is well established. Therefore, the objection of cultural relativism must also be answered with empirical data, such as that already presented. In this regard David Sidorsky observes: "While there is evidence of the plurality of moral concepts and attitudes, there is also evidence for universality."⁶⁸ Whether or not there are universal patterns in human culture, persons are able to translate concepts from one language and culture to another, to communicate, to persuade, and to change not only their own way of thinking but that of others.

Moreover, lack of agreement today does not mean that there will be no agreement tomorrow. The history of the human rights movement to date suggests that a consensus is developing. Certainly, there is no proof that "the human condition involves an ineradicable inability to recognize and understand moral terms like universal human rights."⁶⁹

Nonetheless, the argument that human rights cannot be meaningfully understood apart from a community, which nurtures and sustains them, is a major obstacle in asserting that human rights are global. Robin Lovin argues that rights are not derived from governmental declarations, but "arise out of shared aspirations worked out in a common arena of cultural, political and economic encounters."⁷⁰ This is evident in the historical development of nations and, in places such as Europe, of regional organizations as well. However, he writes that, "when we reach the scale of global humanity, the patterns of shared life from which commitments to shared rights might grow do not yet exist."⁷¹

Yet, others suggest that world community is becoming a reality.⁷² Vratislav Pechota asserts that international human rights "are a product of the universal human rights culture built on faith in human dignity."⁷³ Moreover, global institutions are functioning, and religious traditions that extend around the world are today drawn more closely together by rapid communication and travel. The Roman Catholic Church is teaching concern for human rights as a part of faith in every part of the world, and Protestant statements on human rights reflect "a growing tradition of human rights concern in modern Protestant Christianity worldwide."⁷⁴

It is true that those working together for human rights are from different communities of faith, as well as different political and social communities. Yet this may not preclude the possibility of a global community of faith in human rights. Robert Gordis suggests that "the contribution of the Vision of Micah to the formulation of human rights is not exhausted by its enunciation of the ideal of peace, nor even by its faith in the destined attainment of this goal," for Micah indicates that the way to peace is through international law, which recognizes the rights of different cultures and peoples.⁷⁵

Here then is a vision of faith that allows for different levels of community. To be sure, the bonds of international community are not as strong as the bonds of national community. Yet, both may exist together, each shaping the nature of the other. If faith means sharing a vision of the world and entering into the struggle to realize that vision with others, such faith in human rights is now global.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith suggests that "what the religious—and secular—communities of the world have in common historically is an increasingly common awareness of the past, in all its dynamic diversity and cohesion, and an increasingly common involvement in and shared responsibility for an increasingly joint future."⁷⁶ I would add that they also have increasingly a common faith in human rights.

The evidence presented of faith in human rights in the legal and religious traditions of the globe reveals a surprisingly cooperative effort by legal and religious advocates, in local as well as international struggles, to realize human rights for the sake of human dignity. People from different communities of religious faith are working with people of no religious faith, in local groups and international organizations and movements. The result, I am suggesting, is an evolving global community of faith in human rights.⁷⁷

Thus, human rights are not merely a matter of political or ethical concern, but a matter of faith: not "blind faith" but faith involving commitment to standards of human dignity, even at risk to one's own life. Such faith involves trusting in these standards of human dignity, despite the inability to prove to the satisfaction of all others that the standards are true. Jerome Hall, employing legal rules of evidence, concludes that, "faith is a complex conviction and experience composed of rational and nonrational, but not irrational, factors."⁷⁸ Such faith, more bold than blind, is evident in the lives of many human rights advocates around the globe. In this "action-oriented way of thinking, reason carries faith along with it. . .."⁷⁹

Faith in this sense is a part of all morality. Christopher Mooney affirms that "morality, unlike ethical reflection, is not a purely rational phenomenon; it is also a product of affectivity, mysticism, and faith."⁸⁰ Morality has to do with acting as well as thinking, as does human rights. Both morality and human rights involve faith. Huston Smith notes that "Philip Rieff likens faith to the glue that holds communities together. . .."⁸¹ Perhaps faith in human rights is necessary to hold together the world community.

From the evidence presented, one can conclude that faith in human rights reflects a convergence of the religious wisdom of the world. Huston Smith asserts that "In faith, the West emphasizes what Tillich called prophetic faith (the holiness of the ought) while the East highlights ontological faith (the holiness of the is)."⁸² Modern conceptions of human rights are largely the fruits of prophetic faith, and so it is not surprising that members of the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions have historically been more involved in advocating human rights through law. Yet, in the crucible of the Third World, human rights are being refashioned to reflect the conditions for human dignity that have long been cherished in cultures of the eastern and southern continents.

Globally then, an interaction is occurring that involves East and West and North and South, and the reforging of both religious and legal traditions, in a process of shaping a new world community and international order. Faith in human rights is an essential element in this process of renewal. The outcome is not yet clear, for violations of human rights are numerous and widespread. However, faith in human rights has been strengthened rather than weakened by oppression, because oppressors tend to make martyrs of the faithful, who become a source of inspiration for others.

There are dangers here, of course, as faith may be false and not saving. Richard John Neuhaus writes that those who:

He argues that to resist the claims of the state, "The churches must develop a theology and a piety that undergird our commitment to human rights with a transcendent understanding of the dignity of the person."⁸⁴

Moreover, Neuhaus warns us to guard against placing too much trust in the current enthusiasm for human rights. For the "only devotion to human rights that can be trusted is a long-distance devotion that has pondered the bloody face of our age."⁸⁵ He argues that, with those awaiting the Messianic age, "we know that our commitment to human rights does not depend on the consistency with which that commitment can be implemented."⁸⁶ Instead, "Our commitment to human rights . . .[depends] on a promise that bestows dignity upon every person and demands of every person a respect—no, a reverence—for the dignity of all others."⁸⁷

Wilfred Cantwell Smith cautions that, "To subordinate faith, or to try to subordinate it, to any practical purpose, however worthy, is explosively distorting."⁸⁸ Faith in human rights, to be saving, must affirm a moral order that transcends and grounds human endeavors. In the words of Robert Bellah, "only when our action comes from the heart of our faith will it avoid distortion and destruction."⁸⁹

Yet, there is hope, for this faith is rooted in reality. One of the most important resources in the world, Alan Paton asserts,

The truth of this statement is evident today in the worldwide struggle by women and men of faith to secure human rights as the conditions of human dignity in community.

Faith in human rights is a way of affirming a "higher law" that justifies and limits the lawful power of the state and recognizes the dignity of the human person as the purpose and standard of all law. It is faith that the universe is on the side of freedom and justice and thus, in the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., it is "faith that right defeated is stronger than evil triumphant."⁹¹ It is faith in the power of love, which King described as a "Hindu-Muslim-Christian-Jewish-Buddhist belief about ultimate reality."⁹²

Before his assassination, King began calling for an "economic bill of rights" in addition to civil rights, for he saw both as necessary dimensions of "the struggle for human dignity."⁹³ In accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, he proclaimed an "audacious faith" that "peoples everywhere can have three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits."⁹⁴

With this faith men and women of different religious traditions will be able to labor together to gather in the harvest of justice and peace. With this faith religious and secular leaders will be able to join hands and walk together in the long march for freedom, democracy, and human rights. With this faith people of every color and creed and culture will be able to lift up their voices together to preserve the beauty of the earth and the glory of the skies.

With this faith we will be able to work together with compassion and strive together with courage to secure the conditions of human dignity—not only for ourselves, but also for all people.

Notes to Chapter 13 - Global Faith

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1 in Faith: A Christian Bible Study † Copyright © 2000 by Robert Traer